Abstract-Wireless sensor networks are increasingly deployed in security-critical areas, such as battle field. However, general sensor nodes are manufactured with inexpensive components, and they are short of security enhancement. Therefore, an adversary could capture and compromise sensor nodes easily, then launch some malicious attacks (including tampering or discarding useful data collected from source nodes). In this paper, we propose a secure routing and aggregation protocol with low energy cost for sensor networks (named STAPLE), which utilizes one-way hash chain and multi-path mechanism to achieve security of wireless sensor networks, and develop a network expanding model to control communication cost incurred by multi-path routing. Then we discuss the protocol application in multi-sink wireless sensor networks. Finally, we perform the simulation of STAPLE in comparison with INSENS, the results demonstrate that STAPLE achieves a higher level security with considerably low communication overhead.
networks. Section 3 gives assumptions and terminologies. Details of STAPLE are proposed in section 4. Simulation and evaluation are given in section 5. The last section is our conclusion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK

A. One-way Hash Chain
Using message authentication code (MAC), Zhu et al. presented an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme [10] , which guarantees the base station detects injected false data packets, when no more than a certain number nodes are compromised. But this scheme requires each cluster has fixed nodes, such as 3, 4, or 5. Yang et al. proposed SDAP [11] , based on the principles of divideand-conquer and commit-and-attest, is a general-purpose secure aggregation protocol applicable to multiple aggregation functions. The spirit of SDAP is similar to Merkle hash tree [12] . Nevertheless, communication cost of SDAP is fairly high. Ye et al. presented a statistical enroute filtering (SEF) mechanism [13] that can detect and drop false reports injected by compromised nodes. Each sensing data should be validated by MAC, which is generated by a node that detects the same event. But SEF needs a global key pool and key distribution before sensor deployment. Chan et al. presented an algorithm for provably secure hierarchical in-network data aggregation [14] . It is guaranteed to detect any manipulation of aggregation by adversary beyond what is achievable through direct injection of data values at compromised nodes.
B. Multi-path Routing
Deng et al. provided two secure strategies [15] . First, secure multi-path routing to multiple destination base stations is designed to provide intrusion tolerance against isolation of a base station. Second, anti-traffic analysis strategies are proposed to help disguise the location of base station from eavesdroppers. Then Deng et al. described an INtrusion-tolerant routing protocol for wireless SEnsor NetworkS (INSENS) [9] , the key object is to tolerate damage caused by an intruder, who has compromised deployed sensor nodes and is intent on injecting, modifying, or blocking packets. INSENS is an important multi-path routing protocol for wireless sensor networks, but the routing tables of sensor nodes are computed in sink node, this may cause a high computation cost in sink node and a high communication cost to distribute the routing tables, especially in large scale sensor networks. Other researchers are also productive in this area. Lee et al. proposed a distributed secure multi-path solution [16] to route data across multiple paths so that intruders require much more resources to mount successful attacks. Nassr et al. addressed the problems of scalability and reliability in sensor network routing through a simple but powerful scheme [17] implemented on Mica2 motes, which significantly improves upon results from standard TinyOS [18] routing implementation of MINTRoute. Multi-path routing is efficient in false node tolerance, however, it causes fairly high communication cost, which is a critical problem in wireless sensor networks.
C. Multi-sink
In [19] , Oyman et al. proposed a multiple sinks WSN architecture where the network is partitioned into clusters. All the sources in a cluster were assigned to send the data to the sink designated to that particular cluster. In [20] , Thulasiraman et al. considered a multi-drain sensor network. Data from each source is logged into two distinct drains for data collection to be resilient to any single drain failure. In [21] , the upper and lower bounds for the optimal solution of the multiple sink problem are obtained. It is shown that the bounds are tight for networks with a large number of nodes. As stated in [22] . While incrementing the number of sink nodes by one, the network lifetime is evaluated. The search will stop, whenever the desired lifetime is reached.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES
We assume that a large number of sensor nodes and several sink nodes are contained in a sensor network. Sensor nodes have limited memory, energy capacity, computation and communication capabilities, consequently, they are easy to be compromised. While sink nodes are security-enhanced and difficult to be compromised. Each sensor node contains several items of information, shown in Table I . There are m sink nodes and n sensor nodes deployed in sensor network. These nodes are divided into m clusters, each of which contains one sink node and m n sensor nodes. The price of a sink node is a and the price of a sensor node is b, usually a is much higher than b. Communication area of a sensor node is round, the radius of which is r, and the average distance between them is d. To guarantee all the nodes could communicate, the length of r must be larger than that of d. A sensor node has energy capacity of e, and the energy consumption in each communication session is t, that means a sensor node can send and receive t e data packets. The parameters of network are shown in Table II .
An adversary could capture a small ratio of sensor nodes, then he can fetch the keys and the MACs, and analyze protocols or algorithms exactly. We assume the adversary could control the compromised nodes to launch a variety of attacks. However, no sensor node has been compromised before deployment.
The following notations are used in the description of our protocol:
• m1|m2 denotes the concatenation of two messages m1 and m2.
• E( k, m) refers to the encryption of message m using key k.
HMAC( k, m)
is the message authentication code (MAC) of message m with key k.
IV. THE DETAIL OF STAPLE
A. Network Initialization
After deployment of sensor network, STAPLE is launched by sink node. It organizes sensor nodes in different levels according to the minimum hops away from sink node, then generates keys and MACs and builds hash chains for sensor nodes. STAPLE achieves three goals during this phase: First, find all the sensor nodes hop by hop; Second, organize sensor nodes into different levels, and build parent-brother-child relationships between them; Third, generate key(s) and a MAC for each sensor node. After all nodes are discovered, the initialization phase ends up. If a node has n parents, it has n keys. However, each sensor node has only one MAC.
B. Data Transmission and Filtering
After initialization phase, source node generates data, sending it to its parents. Then parents transmit data packets to grandparents. Hop by hop, the packet is authenticated or filtered by the intermediate nodes.
During this phase, STAPLE achieves the following three goals: First, authenticate child node's identity; second, authenticate data integrity; Third, filter out false data packet. As shown in Figure 2 , node w generates data, and sends a packet to parent v with the following format: 
C. Source Authentication in Sink
When sink node receives data packets, it will authenticate their sources. In this phase, STAPLE achieves the following two goals: First, authenticate the identity of source node; Second, authenticate the integrity of data. Sink node does the following steps to achieve these two goals:
12) Decrypt the packet, get data and message digest from source node w. 13 To prevent intermediate nodes' malicious behaviors, sink node utilizes the random number, remaining only in sink node, to compute source node's MAC for authentication. We can guarantee that no intermediate node can compute the source node's MAC, because it does not have the random number. However, if the source node's MAC has been leaked, an adversary may forge a compromised source node and generate false data. This problem is described in the last section.
D. Network Expanding Model in one cluster
First we analyze one cluster, which contains one sink node and m n sensor nodes. Since multi-path mechanism is used in STAPLE to tolerate false nodes and it may cause high communication cost, we develop a mathematical model to evaluate the effect. In this section, we focus on the network expanding model, and find the factors influencing node's number of parents ss(Multipath mechanism is built by transmitting data to multiple parents.), then we give some effective mechanisms to limit communication cost. Proof: The distance between two adjacent levels of sensor nodes is l. The distance between a sensor node and its neighbors in adjacent level must be shorter than communication radius r; but on average there must be a sensor node in the distance of r-d, because the average distance between sensor nodes is d. We can get the relationship: r − d < l < r, and we get the following assumption:
As shown in Figure 3 , a node is located in level i, and its parents are located in level i−1, while its children are located in level i+1. Parents should also be covered by communication radius, so we assume the length of level i remaining in the circle is m. Based on theory of trigonometry, we have the following equation: 
E. Application in multi-sink sensor networks
In large-scale networks with a large number of sensor nodes, multiple sink nodes should be deployed, not only to increase the manageability of the network, but also to reduce the energy dissipation at each node. Therefore, for an economically feasible investment, the designer should focus on correct placement and optimal number of the sink nodes. In [19] , several approaches have been discussed for the correct placement, while in this paper so we focus optimal number of sink nodes. Deploying multiple sink nodes is necessary in large-scale sensor networks, but sink node is much more expansive than sensor node, so deploying too many sink nodes might be not economical.
Then we define a concept: round, in a round, each sensor node sends one data packet to its sink node through single path. As the total energy of sensor network is limited, the number of rounds is also limited. • Compared with INSENS, STAPLE transmits data packet to sink node with higher possibilities.
• As false node ratio increases, the possibility of successfully transmitting data to sink decreases.
• As number of parents increases, the possibility of successfully transmitting data to sink increases both in STAPLE and INSENS. The performance of STAPLE in large scale sensor networks is evaluated in Figure 8 , and the data transmission policy is modified based on equation 2 and equation 3: the packet number incurred by multi-path routing is limited into a constant, such as 50 in our simulation. When false node ratio increases, the possibility of successfully transmitting data to sink node decreases.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper proposes the notion of a tradeoff between security and communication cost. The security is achieved via one-way hash chain and multi-path routing mechanism; and control of communication cost is based on the network expanding model and a mathematical limit. Then we discussed the optimal number of sink nodes in multi-sink sensor networks. Finally, from the performance evaluation, our scheme achieves a significant improvement under node failure or selective forwarding attack, compared with INSENS. Our future work includes the follows:
• Evaluate our scheme in realistic applications of wireless sensor networks.
• Consider maintenance of STAPLE, e.g. the key resetting and topology repair caused by network dynamics. 
